Stace, for instance, goes on to warn us that Hegel does not succeed in applying this pattern throughout the philosophical system. Hegel here abandons the triadic method. McTaggart []: Some scholars apply the triadic form fairly loosely across several stages e. Burbidge 43—5; Taylor — For G. The first sense of triplicity echoes the textbook, Being-Nothing-Becoming example. In some triads, the third term obviously mediates between the first two terms.
Abstract Purpose is the thought of any kind of purposiveness, where the purpose has not been further determined or defined. Maybee — According to the example and model, Abstract Purpose would be the moment of understanding or thesis, Finite Purpose would be the dialectical moment or antithesis, and Realized Purpose would be the speculative moment or synthesis.
Since the second determination is different from the first one, it is the logical negation of the first one, or is not -the-first-determination. Since Finite Purpose, for instance, has a definition or determination that is different from the definition that Abstract Purpose has, it is not -Abstract-Purpose, or is the negation or opposite of Abstract Purpose in that sense.
Other problems remain, however. Because the concept of Realized Purpose is defined through a syllogistic process, it is itself the product of several stages of development at least four, by my count, if Realized Purpose counts as a separate determination , which would seem to violate a triadic model. Moreover, the concept of Realized Purpose does not, strictly speaking, seem to be the unity or combination of Abstract Purpose and Finite Purpose.
Realized Purpose is the result of and so unifies the syllogistic process of Finite Purpose, through which Finite Purpose focuses on and is realized in a particular material or content.
Realized Purpose thus seems to be a development of Finite Purpose, rather than a unity or combination of Abstract Purpose and Finite Purpose, in the way that Becoming can be said to be the unity or combination of Being and Nothing. For the concept of Being, for example, its moment of understanding is its moment of stability, in which it is asserted to be pure presence.
Being thus sublates itself because the one-sidedness of its moment of understanding undermines that determination and leads to the definition it has in the dialectical moment. The speculative moment draws out the implications of these moments: it asserts that Being as pure presence implies nothing.
It even puts Being into a new state as the prefix ent - suggests because the next concept, Nothing, will sublate cancel and preserve Being. The concept of Nothing also has all three moments. When it is asserted to be the speculative result of the concept of Being, it has its moment of understanding or stability: it is Nothing, defined as pure absence, as the absence of determination.
Nothing thus sublates itself : since it is an undefined content , it is not pure absence after all, but has the same presence that Being did.
It is present as an undefined content. Nothing thus sublates Being: it replaces cancels Being, but also preserves Being insofar as it has the same definition as an undefined content and presence that Being had. We can picture Being and Nothing like this the circles have dashed outlines to indicate that, as concepts, they are each undefined; cf.
Maybee 51 :. The dialectical process is driven to the next concept or form—Becoming—not by a triadic, thesis-antithesis-synthesis pattern, but by the one-sidedness of Nothing—which leads Nothing to sublate itself—and by the implications of the process so far. Since Being and Nothing have each been exhaustively analyzed as separate concepts, and since they are the only concepts in play, there is only one way for the dialectical process to move forward: whatever concept comes next will have to take account of both Being and Nothing at the same time.
Moreover, the process revealed that an undefined content taken to be presence i. The next concept, then, takes Being and Nothing together and draws out those implications—namely, that Being implies Nothing, and that Nothing implies Being. It is therefore Becoming, defined as two separate processes: one in which Being becomes Nothing, and one in which Nothing becomes Being.
We can picture Becoming this way cf. Maybee 53 :. In a similar way, a one-sidedness or restrictedness in the determination of Finite Purpose together with the implications of earlier stages leads to Realized Purpose. I go to a restaurant for the purpose of having dinner, for instance, and order a salad. My purpose of having dinner particularizes as a pre-given object—the salad. But this object or particularity—e.
We can picture Finite Purpose this way:. In the dialectical moment, Finite Purpose is determined by the previously ignored content, or by that other content. The one-sidedness of Finite Purpose requires the dialectical process to continue through a series of syllogisms that determines Finite Purpose in relation to the ignored content. The first syllogism links the Finite Purpose to the first layer of content in the object: the Purpose or universality e.
But the particularity e. Thus, the first singularity e. This new singularity e. In the speculative moment, Finite Purpose is determined by the whole process of development from the moment of understanding—when it is defined by particularizing into a pre-given object with a content that it ignores—to its dialectical moment—when it is also defined by the previously ignored content.
We can picture the speculative moment of Finite Purpose this way:. As soon as Finite Purpose presents all the content, there is a return process a series of return arrows that establishes each layer and redefines Finite Purpose as Realized Purpose.
We can picture Realized Purpose this way:. Instead of trying to squeeze the stages into a triadic form cf. This sort of process might reveal a kind of argument that, as Hegel had promised, might produce a comprehensive and exhaustive exploration of every concept, form or determination in each subject matter, as well as raise dialectics above a haphazard analysis of various philosophical views to the level of a genuine science.
We can begin to see why Hegel was motivated to use a dialectical method by examining the project he set for himself, particularly in relation to the work of David Hume and Immanuel Kant see entries on Hume and Kant. Although we may have to use careful observations and do experiments, our knowledge of the world is basically a mirror or copy of what the world is like.
Take the scientific concept of cause, for instance. According to that concept of cause, to say that one event causes another is to say that there is a necessary connection between the first event the cause and the second event the effect , such that, when the first event happens, the second event must also happen.
It follows that the necessary, causal connection between the two events must itself be out there in the world. There is nothing in the world itself that our idea of cause mirrors or copies. Nicholas Copernicus was the Polish astronomer who said that the earth revolves around the sun, rather than the other way around. We can reestablish a connection between reason and knowledge, however, Kant suggested, if we say—not that knowledge revolves around what the world is like—but that knowledge revolves around what we are like.
For the purposes of our knowledge, Kant said, we do not revolve around the world—the world revolves around us. Because we are rational creatures, we share a cognitive structure with one another that regularizes our experiences of the world. This intersubjectively shared structure of rationality—and not the world itself—grounds our knowledge.
While the intersubjectively shared structure of our reason might allow us to have knowledge of the world from our perspective, so to speak, we cannot get outside of our mental, rational structures to see what the world might be like in itself. How, for Hegel, can we get out of our heads to see the world as it is in itself? Plato argued that we have knowledge of the world only through the Forms.
The Forms are perfectly universal, rational concepts or ideas. Because the world is imperfect, however, Plato exiled the Forms to their own realm. Although things in the world get their definitions by participating in the Forms, those things are, at best, imperfect copies of the universal Forms see, e. The Forms are therefore not in this world, but in a separate realm of their own. Aristotle argued, however, that the world is knowable not because things in the world are imperfect copies of the Forms, but because the Forms are in things themselves as the defining essences of those things see, e.
As Hegel apparently put it in a lecture, the opposition or antithesis between the subjective and objective disappears by saying, as the Ancients did,. If we were to deprive a dog of its animality we could not say what it is. We can use our reason to have knowledge of the world because the very same reason that is in us, is in the world itself as it own defining principle. The rationality or reason in the world makes reality understandable, and that is why we can have knowledge of, or can understand, reality with our rationality.
The only way to completely stop the privacy invasions, expanding domestic police powers, land grabs, insane wars against inanimate objects and transient verbs , covert actions, and outright assaults on individual liberty, is to step outside the dialectic.
This releases us from the limitations of controlled and guided thought. When we understand what motivated Hegel, we can see his influence on all of our destinies. Dialogues and consensus-building are primary tools of the dialectic, and terror and intimidation are also acceptable formats for obtaining the goal.
The ultimate Third Way agenda is world government. Today the dialectic is active in every political issue that encourages taking sides. We can see it in environmentalists instigating conflicts against private property owners, in democrats against republicans, in greens against libertarians, in communists against socialists, in neo-cons against traditional conservatives, in community activists against individuals, in pro-choice versus pro-life, in Christians against Muslims, in isolationists versus interventionists, in peace activists against war hawks.
No matter what the issue, the invisible dialectic aims to control both the conflict and the resolution of differences, and leads everyone involved into a new cycle of conflicts. This was due partly to the rediscovery and reevaluation of him as the philosophical progenitor of Marxism by philosophically oriented Marxists, partly through a resurgence of the historical perspective that Hegel brought to everything, and partly through increasing recognition of the importance of his dialectical method.
The Hegelian dialectical formula: A thesis versus B anti-thesis equals C synthesis. For example: If A my idea of freedom conflicts with B your idea of freedom then C neither of us can be free until everyone agrees to be a slave. The Soviet Union was based on the Hegelian dialectic, as is all Marxist writing. They merely changed the dialectical language to fit into the modern version of Marxist thinking called communitarianism.
If the ideas, interpretations of experiences, and the sources are all wrong, can a conclusion based on all these wrong premises be sound? The answer is no.
Two false premises do not make a sound conclusion even if the argument follows the formula. Three, four, five, or six false premises do not all combine to make a conclusion sound. You must have at least one sound premise to reach a sound conclusion. Logical mathematical formulas are only the basis for deductive reasoning.
Already gaining substantial ground against the Americans, British Marxism was bolstered when CharlesDarwin published his theory of human evolution in Engels, according to modern day scholars,seized upon Darwin's theory to substantiate communism:"When Marx read The Origin of Species he wrote to Engels that, 'although it is developed in the crudeEnglish style, this is the book which contains the basis in natural history for our view.
Since they were slippery customersrather than scientists, they were not likely to relinquish their views just because something did not fit. Then the "slippery" Engels seized upon Morgan's workas the constantly "evolving" basis for the totally unsubstantiated theory of natural social evolution intoutopian world communism. Hegel's formula has been so successful that in all U. Conclusion:The Hegelian dialectic presupposes the factual basis for the theory of social evolutionary principles, whichcoincidentally backed up Marx.
Marx's Darwinian theory of the "social evolution of the species," eventhough it has been used for a century to create a vast new scientific community, including eugenics andsocio-economics , does not adhere to the basis for all good scientific research, and appears to existmainly to advance itself, and all its sub-socio-scientific arms, as the more moral human science. To theACL this means the entire basis for the communitarian solution is based on a false premise, because.
The London-Marxist platform in was "to abolish private property. Marxist societies confiscate wealth and promise to "re-distribute itequally. Modern Marxist adherents openly claim they will "rebuild the world," and they train activist "changeagents" to openly support overthrowing the legitimate governments of the world. Since their inception,Marxist agent provocateurs can be linked to every anarchist assassination and student uprising thatcaused chaos to the established European civilization throughout the 18th and 19th centuries.
ModernAmericans have succumbed to the conspiracy theory label and will only listen to what the propagandamachines tell them. Now our people don't believe anyone other than maybe the Arab world "hates ourfreedom.
We used to call it "a cheap parlor trick" until a responder to thispage wondered how we could call it "cheap" when it's been so successful. And he was right. Thedialectical arguments for human rights, social equity, and world peace and justice are a perfectlydesigned diversion in the defeated British Empire's Hegelian-Fabian-Metaphysical-TheosophicalMonopoly game.
It's the most successful con job in the history of the modern world. The communitarian synthesis is the final silent move in a well-designed, quietly implemented plot to remake the world into colonies. To us it doesn't matter if there is some form of ancient religion that propelsthe plotters, nor does it really matter if it turns out they're aliens as some suggest.
The bottom line is theHegelian dialectic sets up the scene for state intervention, confiscation, and redistribution in the U. The Hegelian dialectic is not a conspiracy theorybecause the Conspiracy Theory is a fraud. We've all been duped by global elitists who plan to taketotalitarian control of all nation's people, property, and produce. Communitarian Plans exist in everycorner of the world, and nobody at the local level will explain why there's no national legal avenue towithdraw from the U.
Appendix:Check out Dialectics for Kids! Everything changes, and Dialectics for Kids explains how. If you are old enough to read, you canunderstand change. It's so simple even grown-ups can understand. They havedeveloped a distinctive political project, exploring the new institutions and forums of a collective society.
They twist logic to get toconclusions that will suit the current prejudices. They garnish it with a little Christianity or mysticism orwhatever, though these play no important part in their world outlook. The programme links our continuous andwhat should be all-encompassing agitational work with our ultimate aim of a communitarian, orcommunist, system. Our programme thus establishes the basis for agreed action and is the lodestar,the point of reference, around which the voluntary unity of the Socialist Alliance is built and concretised.
That questioning is one of the main points of a negative dialectic. A negative dialectic would thus never really end at all but would always find itself confronted with something that is necessary for it but not graspable by thought. But what would that be? Adorno tries several ways to make this point. Hegel thought we could coherently think of the infinite, but it was a sad joke to think we could intuit it.
That much would be admitted by everybody. Who is giving the orders on the boat? Where is it going? The authority of the successor is what it is by virtue of the determinate way it is required by the breakdown of the authority it succeeds. This occurs abstractly in the Logic as one shape of thought generates its own paradoxes and requires another determinate shape to make it good , and it occurs more concretely in the history of human social and political life.
How does that work? The quick answer requires some unpacking. For Adorno, subjectivity is always defined on all sides by its contrast with other ways of thinking and living. Any and all attempts at understanding the whole from within the whole are doomed to failure because of this finitude. Moreover, this Heideggerian way of posing the issue also licenses Adorno, or so he claims, from any and all charges of the kind of self-contradiction found in those who claim everything is relative.
For Hegel, the conceptual is boundless, infinite, whereas for Adorno it is fully bounded by the contingencies of human existence in time. However, that can only be the negative dialectic in its most general form. In the Phenomenology and then later in the series of lectures on the philosophy of history, religion, art and on the history of philosophy itself, Hegel displayed the inherent tensions in the ways in which any given form of human life shapes itself around a certain conception of the absolute not merely abstractly but concretely in all its various ways of embodying those thoughts in family life, politics, religion, art, economies and the like.
Those shapings embody tensions and contradictions within themselves that, however pressure-laden they are, do not appear to be fatal until practice has shown them to be in fact unbearable. At that point, those people can no longer be those people, the shape of life falls apart in various ways and sometimes collapses altogether , and it is succeeded by some other shape that has gathered itself out of the ruins of the old life and made something new with whatever it was that still worked in it.
And that opens up a practical dimension of the dialectic that Adorno thinks is effectively excluded by the merely affirmative dialectic. More needs to be said. But maybe that was what Hegel meant by the dialectic all along. Near the end of his life, Hegel received a note from a student, Christian Weisse, which contained the following remark: You yourself, honored teacher, once orally indicated to me that you were totally convinced of the necessity of further progress and newer embodiments of the world-spirit, which would go further than the completed embodiment of science that you yourself had brought about.
But you were not able to give me any further account of this. It was probably given in person. Adorno, however, seems to think Hegel could have had no real reply, and that is the final part of his argument for the negative dialectic. Hegelians are not completely unconvinced.
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